INTRODUCTION
Commercial agreements often provide for "fixed sums" payable upon a specified breach. Such provisions may serve a broad array of specific purposes. However, most of these purposes will focus upon one of three 1 general objectives: (1) good faith estimation of damages likely to be caused by the specified breach; (2) coercion of performance by requiring, in the event of non-performance, the payment of a fixed sum that exceeds any reasonable estimate of actual damages; or (3) limitation of damages by fixing a sum less than any reasonable estimate of actual damages. This article will focus on the 2 distinction between the first two objectives-estimation of actual damages, as contrasted with coercion of performance through the use of a penalty for nonperformance. The former is generally enforceable in commercial agreements 3 in all legal systems. However, the latter has historically been deemed invalid 4 under the common law based on its coercive nature and punitive effect when enforced. In the discussion that follows, and consistent with common 5 practice, I will use the term "liquidated damages" clause to refer to a "fixed 6 sum" intended as a good faith estimate of actual damages, while I will use the term "penalty" clause to refer to a punitive "fixed sum" intended to deter breach beyond the effect provided by the standard monetary "expectation" remedy for breach.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the "CISG") does not expressly address fixed sums in either form. While CISG Article 6 grants the parties the autonomy to agree upon the payment of fixed sums in the event of breach, CISG Article 4 relegates questions of the "validity" of such an agreement to domestic national law. 7 Thus, the traditional view provides that the "validity" of a clause providing for
1.
See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 811 (4th ed. 2004 GOODS (CISG) 93, ¶ 44 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010).
5.
Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.18, at 812-13 (explaining the common law as limiting fixed sums to those that are "compensatory" in nature-in contrast, by implication, to those that are "punitive" in nature).
6. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.18, at 811-12; MURRAY, supra note 2, at § 125, at 812-13. a "fixed sum" as a "penalty" in the event of breach will depend on the applicable domestic national law-likely rendering the clause valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others. This traditional view has recently been 8 challenged in commentary suggesting that issues involving any agreement for a fixed sum-whether liquidated as a reflection of actual damages or coercive as a penalty-should be resolved by reference to the CISG and should be generally enforced. The CISG Advisory Council is also currently considering 9 the issue. The purpose of this article is to explore and evaluate these newly 10 suggested rationalizations for diverging from the traditional view, as well as the original basis and continuing vitality of that traditional view.
The article begins with a description of the traditional approach to penalty clauses found in contracts governed by the CISG and addresses two distinct challenges to the traditional methodology (Part 2). The article then goes on to address the two underlying principles relied upon by any challenge to the traditional orthodoxy-party autonomy (Part 3) and uniformity (Part 4). Finally, the article concludes by suggesting the continuing vitality of the traditional view, fully relegating the validity of any "penalty" clause to domestic national law-without reference to the CISG.
THE TREATMENT OF PENALTY CLAUSES FOUND IN CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY THE CISG
The CISG does not expressly address "fixed sums," whether intended to liquidate damages or deter breach. Thus, we begin with the parties' right to agree upon the payment of a fixed sum in the event of a breach, which is unquestionably established by Article 6, as a simple derogation from the default remedies provided by the CISG. However, such an agreement by the parties remains subject to any question of validity, which Article 4 relegates to domestic national law. In an effort to avoid the application of domestic 11 law on validity, on its own terms, one might suggest that we look to the CISG to interpret and apply that domestic law, or one might suggest that penalty clauses do not actually raise an issue of validity, as that term is used in CISG the Convention governs "penalty" clauses is whether such clauses raise questions of "validity," as that term is used in Article 4. An issue of illegality, such as to render a contract "void" is almost certainly one of "validity," governed by otherwise applicable law-and not by the Convention. U.S. law 15 governing the sale of goods renders a "penalty" clause "void" based on the 16 common law policies abhorring penalties in contract remedies, in much the same manner that U.S. law would render a contract for the sale of heroin void. Thus, U.S. domestic law firmly establishes that the issue is one of "validity," under U.S. law. Domestic law characterizations of "validity" are not, however, dispositive.
17
The "validity exception" of Article 4(a) is limited by its introductory clause, "except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention." Moreover, this phrase is broadly read to include express provisions of the CISG that impliedly address a particular issue and, thereby, preclude resort to any domestic law of validity. Thus, to the extent that the CISG expressly or 18 impliedly addresses the issue directly, it will be governed by the Convention-and not by domestic law-irrespective of whether it is characterized under domestic law as a question of validity. 
Challenges to the Traditional Orthodoxy
Pascal Hachem and Bruno Zeller have recently suggested, in separate challenges to the traditional orthodoxy, that the validity of a penalty clause in a contract otherwise governed by the CISG must also be determined by reference to the CISG, albeit under somewhat different theories. Hachem acknowledges that Article 4 provides that the validity of fixed sums is governed by domestic law, but suggests that one must apply international 21. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 17, at 21 (providing an example whereby any domestic law treating errors or mistakes with respect to the character of the goods as an issue of validity would be impliedly preempted by the complete treatment of the relevant issues within the Convention).
22. Professor Zeller's position to the contrary is fully addressed infra in Part 2. examination, neither of these two theories provides a sound basis for reference to the CISG in determining the validity of a fixed sum.
Interpretation and Application of Domestic Law Governing Validity by Reference to the CISG
Having unequivocally acknowledged that Article 4 relegates the validity of a penalty clause to otherwise applicable domestic national law, Pascal Hachem nevertheless suggests that the issue must be ultimately resolved by reference to the general principles of the CISG. He reaches this conclusion by arguing, with scant support, that one must interpret and apply the governing 28 domestic law "by applying an international standard," and further suggesting that the issue "must not be decided in accordance with domestic case law." 29 This is a rather remarkable proposition-and one that seemingly stands the familiar principle of uniformity under CISG Article 7(1) on its head.
In circumstances in which a matter is deemed to raise a question of validity under Article 4, the issue is said to reflect an "external gap" in the Convention. While Article 7 plays a preeminent role in filling "internal 30 gaps" in the Convention-issues governed, but not expressly settled within it-Article 7 plays no role in filling "external gaps." Hachem relies on 31 Article 7(1) in support of his proposed "international standard" for interpreting and applying domestic law. However, such an approach is L. REV. 1, 3 (2011); see infra Part 2.2.2.
28. See Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222 (providing no authority for the use of the Convention to interpret and apply domestic law); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 4, at 93 n.151 (citing only Hachem's previous article for authority); Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 145 (citing only Hachem's previous article and commentary for authority, along with a citation to a commentary by Ferrari). The Ferrari commentary cited by Hachem does not, however, appear to provide any support for the idea of interpreting domestic law by reference to the Convention. In paragraph 22, Ferrari merely addresses the "functional equivalence" test for determining whether the issue is governed by domestic law or the CISG. See Franco Ferrari, in SCHLECHTRIEM AND SCHWENZER: KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT, art. 4, ¶ 22 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2008). Inasmuch as Hachem starts from the premise that a penalty clause is governed by domestic law, the "functional equivalence" test arguably has no relevance to his analysis. Ferrari does go on, in the following paragraph 23, to suggest that one must resort to both domestic law and the CISG in applying the "functional equivalence" test. But this is done only for purposes of determining whether the CISG preempts the application of domestic law-and not for purposes of using the Convention to interpret that domestic law.
29. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222; see also Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 145 (explaining that the underlying policies of the CISG must displace an relevant domestic policies in interpreting and applying governing domestic law).
30. HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 79. 31. Id.
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JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 30:153 inconsistent with one of the most basic principles of Article 7 itself-the principle of uniform application of law.
In recognizing the international character of the CISG and requiring a consistent interpretation and application of its provisions across national borders, Article 7(1) seeks to promote a uniform application of the CISG, irrespective of forum or circumstances. Notably, the Uniform Commercial Code-one of the domestic laws that Hachem would interpret and apply by reference to the CISG, instead of domestic case law and policies-also provides for uniform interpretation and application. No serious commentator 32 would argue that one should resort to domestic law to interpret the CISG.
33
This would be flatly contrary to the requirement of Article 7(1), because it would undermine uniformity. It seems remarkably inconsistent, and somewhat hypocritical, to resort to the principle of "internationality" contained in Article 7(1) in a manner that would equally undermine the principle of "uniformity" mandated by the domestic law at issue.
The use of the CISG to interpret domestic law lacks support within the CISG itself, because it is contrary to the basic principle of uniformity in the interpretation and application of law-whether the CISG or domestic national law. Thus, absent some basis for asserting that the CISG directly governs the validity of a penalty clause, the issue should be determined solely by reference to domestic law.
Direct Application of the CISG to Enforce a Penalty Clause
Bruno Zeller asserts that the validity of a penalty clause is directly governed by the CISG because the CISG provides a "functionally adequate solution" to the issue, thus avoiding any need to resort to domestic national law under Article 4. In effect, Zeller suggests that an express provision of the 34 CISG-Article 74-impliedly answers the question, thereby avoiding the operation of the "validity exception" under Article 4(a). Zeller also seems to suggest a separate argument based on domestic law characterizations. This latter issue will be addressed first in order to avoid conflating the two.
Zeller appears to argue that the domestic common law approach to penalty clauses is actually one of "non-enforcement," rather than one of 32. See U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (providing interpretation and application of the Code to promote its underlying purposes and policies, including uniformity); U.C.C. § 1-301 (providing no distinction between the application of the Code in domestic and international transactions).
33. Of course, U.S. courts have all too often done so, but that does not justify this improper practice. 34. Zeller, supra note 27, at 8.
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"invalidity," thus apparently avoiding any invocation of Article 4-even under a domestic law characterization of the issue. However, this characterization 35 is contrary to at least U.S. law governing the sale of goods, which specifically characterizes a penalty clause as "void," just as any illegal transaction is 36 deemed void. Inasmuch as a "penalty" clause raises a question of "validity," it is not governed by the CISG, unless one can find some basis within the CISG for avoiding the validity exception of Article 4. Answering this latter question requires an autonomous determination as to whether a penalty clause raises an issue of "validity," as that term is used in Article 4. Zeller relies on the "functional equivalence test" of whether an issue is one of "validity," as the term is used in Article 4. This test provides a means of determining whether the issue falls within the phrase "except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention," and is therefore governed by the Convention directly. In searching for a "functional equivalent" solution 37 regarding any issues raised by penalty clauses, Zeller points us to Article 74.
38
Zeller focuses on the second sentence of Article 74-the foreseeability limitation-seemingly to argue that Article 74 at least impliedly provides for enforcement of penalty clauses, because such a clause is foreseeable, as an express provision of the parties' agreement. However, this arguably amounts to the use of the "tail" (foreseeability) to "wag the dog" (compensation for the aggrieved party's expectation damages). Instead, one should begin any analysis of Article 74 with its first sentence.
Article 74 provides for actual damages caused by the breach. Such "[d]amages must not place the aggrieved party in a better position that it would have enjoyed had the contract been properly performed." In contrast, 39 Zeller himself admits that a penalty clause, by its nature, provides for an amount that is "greater than the actual damage." An award of punitive 40 damages in excess of a party's actual loss is contrary to the basic principles 35 . Id. at 8-9. Zeller also asserts that domestic law rendering excessive fixed sums void, as a penalty, is somehow unfair in that it has no effect on sums deemed too small. Id. at 4-5. However, unconscionability provides the appropriate mechanism in that case. second sentence-the foreseeability test-does not, as Zeller suggests, provide a fully sufficient independent basis for enforcing anything. Instead, it simply provides a limit on those damages otherwise provable under the first sentence, as indicated by its first two words-"such damages." In other words, "such damages" as established under the first sentence are further subject to the additional limit of foreseeability under the second sentence. This article does not suggest that the enforcement of a penalty clause is to be determined by reference to the CISG. However, if it is so determined, then Article 74 in fact provides a powerful argument against the enforcement of any agreement to the payment of a penalty, as damages. 42. Zeller also argues that certain actual damages are difficult to ascertain, thereby justifying the enforcement of a penalty clause. See Zeller, supra note 27, at 12-13. However, such "actual" damages may be addressed through a proper "liquidated damages" clause. There is no need to enforce "penalties" to achieve this result, and the distinction remains important under the common law.
43. See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: LAW AND PRACTICE, para. 11.38 (2d ed. 2007) (suggesting that the CISG governs the issue and renders penalties unenforceable, as inconsistent with Article 74).
44. See Secretariat Commentary, art. 42 [draft counterpart to CISG art. 46], para. 10, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-46.html (noting that "penalty clauses" are "invalid" in some legal systems where their "validity" may not be recognized).
45. Id. 46. Id. The connection between penalty clauses and the remedy of specific performance, as well as the significance of Article 28, are explored more fully infra Part 4.
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examination of the validity of a penalty clause under domestic law. However, it would seem quite logical that the Secretariat Commentary would address any provision most likely to have such an effect, such as Article 46, and would seem equally illogical that the Secretariat Commentary would be silent regarding another provision that would ultimately dictate that the entire issue is governed by the CISG. In short, Article 74 fails to establish that penalty clauses are otherwise governed by the CISG, and their validity is fully governed by domestic national law.
47
Finally, the drafting history of the CISG strongly suggests that it was not intended to govern penalty clauses. While specifically recognizing the importance of the issue, the drafters deemed it too complex and problematic to be addressed at the time, specifically leaving it for otherwise applicable law -whether in a subsequent convention or domestic law. No uniform 48 solution has yet been adopted, thus leaving the issue to otherwise applicable 49 domestic national law.
Reliance on Articles 6 and 7 to Support Reference to the CISG in Validating a Penalty Clause
At bottom, the approaches of both Hachem and Zeller rest on the principles found in Articles 6 and 7 of the CISG. However, nothing in either 50 of these articles mandates a departure from the traditional rule that the validity of fixed sums must be determined entirely by reference to otherwise applicable law-and not the CISG. As explained below, the parties' exercise of autonomy under Article 6 remains limited to any issue of validity under applicable law-and not the CISG and Article 7 (1) the lack of such uniformity with respect to the general principles underlying differential treatment of penalty clauses is recognized within the CISG itself.
3. ARTICLE 6 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY CISG Article 6 admittedly supports the idea of party autonomy as one of the most fundamental general principles underlying the CISG. Thus, the 53 parties may certainly derogate from the default rule of Article 74, providing for expectation damages, and, instead, fix a penal sum in the event of a breach. However, as a means of overcoming the express language of Article 54 4, this argument either proves too little, or it proves too much. It proves too little in that the parties' autonomy-no matter how expansive under Article 6-is expressly subject to the applicable law governing the exercise of that autonomy, a subject that CISG Article 4 expressly leaves to other law. The late Professor Farnsworth explains the relationship in hierarchical terms as follows:
Article 6 purports to give the parties an unqualified power to vary the effect of the Convention by agreement. On the other hand, article 4 makes it clear that, absent a contrary provision, the Convention does not affect any rule of domestic law dealing with the "validity" of a contract provision. Taken together, articles 6 and 4 create a tripartite hierarchy, with domestic law on validity at the top, the agreement of the parties in the middle, and the Convention at the bottom. 55 Thus, the parties' autonomy cannot serve as a basis for ignoring otherwise applicable domestic laws governing validity, including domestic law governing penalty clauses, because the exercise of that autonomy remains subject to Article 4.
In attempting to narrow the application of Article 4, one might perhaps suggest that the parties' autonomy under Article 6 is subject only to limits on validity relating to the issue of consent. If there is no question of the validity of consent, then the general principle of party autonomy under Article 6 56 gives life to a "penalty" clause notwithstanding Article 4. However, under this approach, the parties' consent under Article 6 would overcome an otherwise Article 7 of the CISG unquestionably mandates an internationally uniform approach to the interpretation of the Convention by reference to the general principles upon which it is based. However, Article 7 has no application to 58 issues not governed by the Convention. Moreover, the treatment of penalty 59 clauses is not internationally uniform, and the divergence between civil and common law treatment is recognized within the CISG itself. 
Article 7(1) and the Interpretation of the Convention
Article 7(1) is limited by its own language to "the interpretation of [the CISG]." Article 4(a) provides that the CISG "is not concerned with . . . the validity of the contract or any of its provisions . . . ." Thus, Article 7(1) and its mandate "to promote uniformity" arguably have no relevance in determining the validity of a penalty clause.
Perhaps one might suggest that Article 7(1) is in fact being used to interpret the provisions of the CISG governing damages, which would arguably "govern" a penalty clause, assuming such a clause to be valid. However, this seems to conflate two distinct issues-that of validity and that of the law governing such clause "if it is valid." While the use of Article 7(1) is perfectly appropriate in the case of the latter, it seems premature in the case of the former.
To the extent that one might argue that Article 7(1) mandates a preference for international norms over domestic law, generally, on issues not governed by the convention, this seems inconsistent with the approach provided in Article 7(2). Even in the case of issues governed by the convention, Article 7(2) mandates reference to the "general principles on which [the CISG] is 166 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 30:153 based," but "in the absence of such principles," defers to domestic national law-not to international norms. Moreover, even if one does look for such international uniformity, that search yields a clear and significant divide between the civil and common law worlds.
Comparative Legal Treatment of Penalty Clauses
The treatment of penalty clauses is fundamentally different, as between civil and common law legal systems. A penalty clause is generally enforceable under the civil law, while it is not enforceable under the common law.
62
Moreover, the same theoretical underpinnings of these different approaches to penalty clauses can also be found in the two legal systems' different approaches to the remedy of specific performance. 
Civil Law
The civil law generally enforces fixed sums, whether intended to approximate damages or to deter breach. Thus, a fixed sum intended as a "penalty" will typically be enforced. While a court may adjust the amount of a "penalty" it considers excessive, the fact that the "penalty" tends to deter breach does not, itself, preclude enforcement. The sole issue is the amount of the penalty and whether that amount is deemed excessive.
64
In view of the fact that most civil law regimes provide limits on the amount of a penalty clause, one might be tempted to suggest a similarity between the civil and common law approach in that each provides certain limits on the amount of a contractually agreed upon fixed sum. However, any such suggestion fails to account for the fundamentally different approaches taken by the two systems in justifying such limits. As explained below, the common law abhors any penalty-irrespective of the amount. 
